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Abstract
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint produc-
tion (and nance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to
multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always
exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no
coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in-
divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we
resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability.
We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric
environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among
other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as
the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these en-
vironments.
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1 Introduction
This paper belongs to the literature on the theory of coalition formation and
allocation gains from cooperation across players. In economic and social en-
vironments where the players may contemplate a possibility of cooperation,
one has to address two sets of questions.
The rst one is positive: How large are the gains from cooperation?
How to identify coalition structures that yield these gains? Will any such
optimalcoalition structure emerge through the voluntary participation of
the players?
The second set of questions is of a normative nature: How the gains from
cooperation should be allocated in a stable conguration? How this alloca-
tion should be modied according to some criterion of fairness in absence of
stability requirement?
While intimately connected, these two sets of questions require sepa-
rate examination. The positive analysis describes the structure of optimal
and/or stable coalition structures. Regarding e¢ ciency, we will consider the
classical rst-best framework without any limitations or constraints on the
transfers of the gains from cooperation, or stated equivalently, we adopt the
transferable utility (TU) setting. From that perspective, e¢ ciency amounts
to identication of coalition structure(s) maximizing the aggregate surplus.
Depending upon the magnitude of the returns from cooperation, the optimal
coalition structure patterns can display di¤erent features: a unique (grand)
coalition when the TU cooperative game is super-additive, several large
coalitions when the TU cooperative game, while not super-additive, still ex-
hibits moderate returns to scale, or even a multiplicity of smallcoalitions
if the gains from cooperation are low or (a fortiori) negative. Stability, on the
other hand, refers to the fact that the coalition structure and the proposed
sharing arrangement of the gains are immune to potential deviations. In this
paper, a potential deviation of a coalition will materialize if, acting on their
own, the coalition members would be better o¤ than under the proposed
arrangement. However, the stability requirement, called secession-proofness
which is related to the notion of core in the cooperative game theory, is very
demanding, and, indeed, the set of stable coalition structures is often empty.
In that case, it is of interest to characterize the set of allocations which in
some sense are closest to being secession-proof and to derive a measure
of the deviation from secession-proofness. In this paper, we will focus on
the concept of least core proposed by Maschler, Shapley and Peleg (1979).
To explain the concept, suppose, that, in absence of the core, each coali-
tion must be submitted to a penalty for seceding from the grand coalition.
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Then the least core would consist of allocations associated with the minimal
penalty that yields secession-proofness. The least core contains (and often
coincides with) the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)).
The second set of questions refers to issues which are normative. Inde-
pendently of any stability considerations, we may examine recommendations
according to some notion of fairness discussed and characterized in the ex-
isting literature. These include the nucleolus, the Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)), and the Dutta-Ray value (Dutta and Ray (1989)), among oth-
ers. While combining positive and normative approaches, we will examine
whether some of these equity concerns are compatible with the secession-
proofness property. Is it conceivable that stability implies per se some
form of fairness, or does a subset of secession-proof allocations satisfy some
fairness properties? Alternatively, is there a fundamental conict between
secession-proofness and fairness?
In this paper we address these questions in the context of the following
cooperative environment. A group of players contemplates the possibility
of creating coalitions to jointly produce and nance a public group project.
For the sake of interpretation, it is convenient to view a public project as a
conventional public good targeted for specic needs: health (hospital), ed-
ucation (school), sport activities (stadium, gym, swimming pool), cultural
activities (theater, museum, library), nancial/postal services (bank, post
o¢ ce), etc. We use the term public to reect the absence of congestion
e¤ects, i.e., there is no rivalry in consumption among users. The gains from
cooperation simply arise from the fact that, as the quality of the service is
not reduced by the presence of additional users, it is always benecial to
increase the size of the group. On the other hand, while projects target
the same need, they still di¤er according to some exogenous horizontal
characteristic. The latter, evaluated by individuals in di¤erent ways, would
represent heterogeneity in our model. Preference heterogeneity will be de-
scribed by one or several parameters; we will refer to this space of parameters
as the space of heterogeneity. A prominent example that we will use as our
key illustration is location. Public projects could be similar in all respects,
except for the spatial dimension: assuming that users minimize the trans-
portation costs incurred by the consumption of the service, they will rank
public projects according to the distance between their own residence and
projectslocation.
In Section 2 we consider a setting with divisible public projects, whose
scale can vary in a continuous manner. Every individual has a unit demand
for the service while exhibiting her own preferences regarding the projects
characteristics. It is traditionally assumed that every individual belongs to
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a unique coalition identied by a public project and its scale. This implies a
one-to-one relationship between the set of membership structures and the set
of partitions. We depart from this structure by allowing the unit demand to
be satised by several coalitions: an individual may split her unit demand
among di¤erent communities. We assume that the cost of operating a com-
munity, i.e., implementing a public project, is proportional to the scale of
operation. A membership structure is now described by two items:
 a vector describing the project scale in every formed community;
 a matrix describing the allocation of the total membership of each
individual across the di¤erent communities, consistent with the project scale
in these communities.
We then explore the set of secession-proof allocations when each formed
community allocates the operating costs to its members. The main result
of this section asserts the existence of secession-proof allocations. As a
byproduct of the proof, we show that there is a one-to-one relationship
between the set of secession-proof allocations and the set of solutions of the
dual of a linear program describing the social planner problem. The dual
variables correspond to Lindahl prices allowing the full decentralization of
core allocations.
In Section 3 we turn to indivisible public projects. We assume that each
project is assigned a xed scale of operation (normalized to one). This set-
ting exhibits a degree of non-convexity due to the fact that the decision of
whether to initiate a public project becomes integer-valued: it attains values
0 or 1 only. Without loss of generality, we assume that every individual is
member of a single coalition. The introduction of indivisibilities amounts
to adding integer constraints in the linear programming formulation, and,
as a result, secession-proof allocations may fail to exist. In fact, there is a
secession-proof allocation only if there is no integrality gap and the replace-
ment of integer constraints by linear ones does not impact the solution. In
Subsection 3.1, we consider a general class of metric environments where
individuals and projects are identied by their locations with the associ-
ated metric of distances. We show that secession-proof allocations do not,
in general, exist and focus our analysis on the least core and the nucleo-
lus. In Subsection 3.2, we consider the special but important case where
the heterogeneity space is one-dimensional and individualspreferences are
single-peaked. This setting yields no integrality gap, and, hence, generates
the existence of secession-proof allocations. We will then characterize the
nucleolus and examine its properties. In particular, we address the issue of
equalization of playerspayo¤s generated by transfers between individuals.
Le Breton and Weber (2003) show that a partial equalization, when the gap
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between advantagedand disadvantaged individuals is reduced but not
completely eliminated, is compatible with secession-proofness, whereas full
equalization and no equalization are, in general, not. We then examine a
degree of equalization imposed by the nucleolus and other solutions.
Section 4 contains the concluding remarks and the description of some
open questions related to this line of research.
The Appendix is partitioned into three parts. In the rst one (A1) we
introduce and discuss various notions of "- and least cores, as well as that
of the nucleolus. The second (A2) is devoted to the introduction and some
results on egalitarian properties of the Dutta-Ray value in our context. Fi-
nally, the last part of the Appendix (A3) contains the derivation of the
nucleolus in the one-dimensional version of our metric game.
Related Literature
This paper belongs to the strand of literature that uses a linear program-
ming approach to explore the core and the set of equilibria in an economic
environment. Thus, it lies at the intersection of these di¤erent areas and
contributions.
First, we mention a class of linear production games, introduced by Owen
(1975), who expanded the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik
(1971)). In linear production games individuals are endowed with a bundle
of inputs from which outputs are produced under linear constraints. The
worth of a coalition is the maximal value of the outputs that can be produced
by the coalition. Cooperative games with side payments arising from such
linear optimization problems were called LP games by Samet and Zemel
(1984). As they show, dual payo¤s can be constructed from any dual optimal
solution. While the core always contains the set of dual payo¤s, in general,
the sets are not identical. Samet and Zemel examine conditions for the
equivalence of two sets. They also demonstrate that the two sets coincide
asymptotically if the set of individuals is replicated many times.
The relationship between the existence of a core under integer constraints
and the integrality gap has also been investigated in other areas of the lit-
erature including markets and multi-item auctions (e.g., Bichchandani and
Mamer (1997), Bichchandani and Ostroy (2002), Kelso and Crawford (1982),
Makowski and Ostroy (2000)). When the individuals are assigned to a single
coalition, the problem studied in this paper is the well documented as Un-
capacited facility location problem which has been extensively investigated
in operations research. The main focus is on the determination of e¢ cient
algorithms and heuristics to deal with the complexities arising from inte-
ger constraints. Few papers have explored the question of the cost sharing
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scheme associated with the optimal solution. The more important contri-
butions are due to Kolen (1983), Tamir (1992) and Goemans and Skutella
(2004). Kolen was the rst to point out the connection between the lin-
ear program identifying the core and the dual of the linear program of the
social planner. Tamir uses a similar argument in a specic metric environ-
ment, whereas Goemans and Skutella present several generalizations of the
previous arguments.
In our paper we extensively use the concept of nucleolus and derived
it in several special cases. One has to note that the computation of the
nucleolus is a notoriously complicated task. It has been calculated for some
classes of cooperative games arising in various environments. Those include
bankruptcy problems (Aumann and Maschler (1985)), sharing of airport
costs (Littlechild (1974), Owen (1974)) and weighted majority games (Peleg
(1968)), among others.
2 The Model with Divisible Public Projects: Gen-
eral Existence of the Core
The environment E that we consider is described by a 5 tuple fN;M;D;C; Fg
where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a nite set of individuals, M = f1; : : : ;mg is
a nite set of public projects, D  (d1; : : : ; dn) is a n dimensional non-
negative vector, C = (cij)1in;1jm is a n m non-negative matrix and
F  (f1; : : : ; fm) is a m dimensional non-negative vector representing the
unitary costs of the di¤erent public projects, where the cost of project j
with the scale yj is fjyj . Public projects are described by a number of char-
acteristics: they are excludable (any individual can be excluded, at no cost,
from the access to a project), but are not subject to congestion (an increase
in the number of individuals consuming the project does not reduce the
quality of the project). The vector D describes the aggregate demand for
public projects for all individuals. For this formulation to be meaningful, it
is implicit that public projects are substitutes in the sense that they target
the same needs. For instance, all of them are either hospitals, libraries, post
o¢ ces, or banks. However, while matching a specic economic or social
activity, they di¤er according to a variety of dimensions (location, qual-
ity, architecture, type of programs, design of the buildings, opening hours,
etc). We will discuss in the concluding section, the issues arising from the
consideration of trulydi¤erent public projects.
A physical allocation is described by a 2 tuple fX; yg where X =
(xij)1in;1jm is a n  m non-negative matrix and y  (y1; : : : ; ym) is
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a m dimensional nonnegative vector. It is feasible if P1jm xij  di for
all i = 1; : : : ; n and xij  yj for all i = 1; : : : ; n and for all j = 1; : : : ;m.
In contrast to the classical literature on coalition structures, we allow here
formultiple membership and an individual could have membership in mul-
tiple communities: xijdi represents the fraction of the total demand of in-
dividual supplied by community j. Thus, the communities are not neces-
sarily disjoint. Hereafter, for all j = 1; :::;m, we will refer to the group
Sj  fi 2 N : xij > 0g as the community (club, jurisdiction) j. The matrix
X describes therefore the structure of membership and the fractional as-
signment of the individuals to the projects. In addition to its membership,
a community j is also described by its size or scale of operation, yj . Fea-
sibility requires that the demand of any member of the club cannot exceed
the "supply" of the club.
Suppose, for example, that the projects are public swimming pools lo-
cated in a given urban area and that each individual i swims a xed number
of hours di per week. Then, the matrix simply describes how the total
amount of swimming time of each individual is shared across the di¤erent
swimming pools. If we denote by yj the number of opening hours of the
swimming pool j, then the time spent in swimming pool j obviously cannot
exceed yj .
While the public projects serve the same basic need, they are not perfect
substitutes. We assume that the gross payo¤ of individual i from consuming
a quantity xij of project j is xij (vi   cij) where vi is set to be a very large
number. The constant benet part will play no role in the analysis and
will be deleted hereafter1. The vector (cij)1jm can be interpreted as the
vector of the unitary individual costs incurred by individual i for di¤erent
projects. The cost is linear in xij and must be therefore interpreted as a
variable cost. In the swimming pool example, if di is the total time spent in
swimming during a given period and if each visit lasts one unit of time, then
xij is simply the number of visits to the swimming pool j. While deriving
a benet from consuming public projects, individuals incur costs (taxes) of
contribution to projects. If ti denotes the total amount of taxes payed by
1Recall that the demand is inelastic and is not responsive to taxes. One could ratio-
nalize the inelastic demand by considering a piecewise linear benet function of the public
good consisting of two components: one [0; di] with a very steep slope vi as long as the
aggregate consumption is less di, and another [di;+1[ with a very at slope whenever the
aggregate consumption exceeds di. As long as prices vary in a bounded interval, individual
i will select the quantity di.
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individual i, then her net payo¤ is equal to
X
1jm
xij (vi   cij)  ti = vidi  
24 X
1jm
cijxij + ti
35 :
Without loss of generality, we will assume that di = 1 for all i 2 N:2
Given an environment E = fN;M;C; Fg, the minimum aggregate cost3 is
the value C(N; E) of the following linear program (L):
Min
nX
i=1
mX
j=1
cijxij +
mX
j=1
fjyj (1)
such that
mX
j=1
xij  1 for all i = 1; : : : ; n (2)
xij  yj for all i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ;m (3)
xij  0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ;m (4)
Let (X; y) =

xij

1in;1jm
;

yj

1jm

be an optimal allocation,
i.e., a solution of the program above. It is obvious that the constraints (2) are
binding. Note that the second component in the aggregate cost C(N; E) =Pn
i=1
Pm
j=1 cijx

ij +
Pm
j=1 fjy

j describes the monetary cost incurred by the
decisions made with regard to di¤erent public projects. This depends upon
the scale chosen for each such project. Note that no scale larger than 1 will
2As long as we can fraction the demand of each individual, we can increase the number
of customers to have a problem with unitary demand for each of them. More precisely, if
di is an integer di¤erent to 1, as long as we can fraction the demand, it is as if we had
di   1 new players (identical to player i) all with a unitary demand. If we are forced,
however, to treat di as a block, such argument does not work. Take, for instance, three
nodes on a line such that the two extreme nodes are equidistant from the center and the
distance is equal to 1. Extreme individuals have a demand equal to 1 and the median
individual has a demand equal to 2. The facility can be constructed at the cost of f in
the extremes but not in the center. If the demand of 2 can be divided into 2 units, the
total cost is 2f +2 (2 facilities of size 1 each) or a single facility of size 2 leading to a cost
of 2f + 4. If the demand of 2 must be treated as a block then the cost is 2f + 4 (if one
facility) or 3f + 2 (if two facilities).
3 In this quasi linear setting there is a complete equivalence between the set of Pareto
optimal allocations and the set of allocations meeting the demand constraints and mini-
mizing the aggregate cost.
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be selected as the aggregate demand of any individual has been normalized
to 1. The vector of taxes T  (t1; : : : ; tn) must balance the budget:
nX
i=1
ti =
mX
j=1
fjy

j :
An allocation is a 3 tuple ffX; yg ; tg where fX; yg is physical allocation
and t is a n-dimensional vector of taxes. It is feasible if fX; yg is feasible
and the budget is balanced. The total cost incurred by individual i 2 N in
such allocation is:
Ti 
mX
j=1
cijxij + ti:
If instead of the entire society N , we consider a subset S  N , the minimum
aggregate cost a¤ordable to S is the value C(S; E) of the following linear
program:
Min
(X;y)
X
i2S
mX
j=1
cijxij +
mX
j=1
fjyj (5)
such that
mX
j=1
xij  1 for all i 2 S (6)
xij  yj for all i 2 S and j = 1; : : : ;m (7)
xij  0 for all i 2 S and j = 1; : : : ;m; (8)
where X = (xij)i2S;1jm is a (#S)  m non-negative matrix and y 
(y1; : : : ; ym) is a m dimensional non-negative vector. In a setting where
the allocation ffX; yg ; tg is secession-proof, the value C(S; E) represents
the stand-alone aggregate cost of group S. It is, in fact, the upper bound
on the aggregate cost that can be charged to S. Formally, an allocation
ffX; yg ; tg is secession-proof if
X
i2S
0@ mX
j=1
cijxij + ti
1A  C(S; E) for all S  N:
It is easy to see that in the space of individual payo¤s, there is a one-
to-one relationship between the set of secession-proof allocations and the
core of the cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of
the characteristic function assigned to a coalition S is C(S; E): Proposition
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1 below asserts that for any environment E , there always exist secession-
proof allocations. In fact, there is a one-to-one relationship between the set
of secession-proof allocations and the optimal solutions of the dual of the
linear program (L). The dual linear program (DL) is presented as follows:
Max
(T;P )
nX
i=1
Ti
such that
nX
i=1
pij  fj for all j = 1; : : : ;m (9)
 pij + Ti  cij for all i 2 N and j = 1; : : : ;m (10)
pij  0 for all i 2 N and j = 1; : : : ;m; (11)
where P = (pij)1in;1jm is a n  m non-negative matrix and T 
(Ti)1in is a n dimensional non-negative vector. We denote by D(N; E)
the value of dual linear program (DL) so described. Let
(P ; T ) =
 
pij

1in;1jm ; (T

i )1in

be an optimal solution of program (DL) and let
ti =
nX
i=1
pijx

ij for all i 2 N :
We claim that the allocation ffX; yg ; tg is secession-proof. Let S be a
proper subset of N: S $ N . We will prove thatX
i2S
T i  C(S; E);
which amounts to show thatX
i2S
T i 
X
i2S
mX
j=1
cijxij +
mX
j=1
fjyj (12)
for all fX; yg satisfying inequalities (6), (7) and (8). From (6) and (10), we
deduce
X
i2S
mX
j=1
cijxij+
mX
j=1
fjyj 
X
i2S
mX
j=1
 
T i   pij

xij+
mX
j=1
fjyj =
X
i2S
T i +
mX
j=1
 
fjyj  
X
i2S
pijxij
!
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Then, from (7), (9) and (11), we obtain
mX
j=1
 
fjyj  
X
i2S
pijxij
!

mX
j=1
 X
i2N
pijyj  
X
i2S
pijxij
!

mX
j=1
 X
i2S
pijyj  
X
i2S
pijxij
!
 0
The inequality (12) follows immediately. By the duality theorem of linear
programming, program (L) and program (DL) yield the same values. Thus,
we have
X
i2N
T i = C(N; E), which implies that any optimal solution of the
dual linear program (DL) is a core imputation generated by a secession-
proof allocation.
Now consider an arbitrary secession-proof allocation ffX; yg ; tg and
let T  be the corresponding core imputation. Let Sj  fi 2 N : T i   cij > 0g
and dene pij as follows
pij =

T i   cij if T i   cij > 0
0 otherwise
We claim that (T ; P ) where P  =

pij

1in;1jm
is an optimal solution
of the dual linear program (DL). Note rst that by construction (10) and
(11) hold true. It remains to prove that:
nX
i=1
pij =
X
i2Sj
pij  fj for all j = 1; : : : ;m:
Assume, on the contrary, that for some j,
P
i2Sj p

ij > fj . This impliesP
i2Sj T

i >
P
i2Sj cij +fj , and therefore that the coalition S

j would benet
from secession, a contradiction to our assumption.
We have proved the following result:
Proposition 1 For any environment E, the set of secession-proof allo-
cations is non empty and it coincides with the set of solutions of the dual
linear program (DL).
As we indicated above, our paper lies at the intersection of di¤erent
research areas, and some of the contributions cited in the introduction should
receive the credit for several of the arguments used here. Our proof is self
contained and quite simple, as it utilizes quite elementary tools from linear
programming.
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 The matrix of dual variables P  =

pij

1in;1jm
has a nice and
important interpretation. It is a matrix of Lindahl prices as there is a price
for each pair composed of a public good and a public project. To some
extent, the proposition above asserting the existence of the core, in fact,
yields the existence of Lindahl equilibria in this quasi-linear economy with
m public goods, one private good and a constant returns to scale technology.
A similar statement appears in Mas-Colell (1980). The optimal behavioral
responses of individuals to these prices provide a decentralization device for
the allocation. While this result could be derived from more general exis-
tence results on Lindahl equilibria under convexity assumptions, the direct
and simple proof provided here is however instructive per se. The prices
also display some interesting features. From the complementary slackness
conditions, we observe that
If xij > 0, then p

ij = T

i   cij and if pij > 0, then xij = yj :
For each i 2 N , let Si 
n
j 2M : xij > 0
o
be the list of communities
containing i as a member. From the rst condition, we obtain the constant
total unit cost for i to get access to any of these communities. This is
of course the only way to guarantee decentralization. If it were violated,
some of these communities, say, j, would be avoided by i, contradicting our
assumption of positive xij . The price equality is interesting as it entails
some form of partial equalization across communities. From the second
condition, we deduce the standard marginal cost pricing rule demanding
that a customer is charged a positive price for her consumption only if the
supply constraint is binding.
 Note that access prices to a specic community j may entail some
discrimination across individuals. It is not di¢ cult to construct examples
of nonexistence under the second best constraint imposing price uniformity
across customers.
 It is not necessarily the case that individual i is indi¤erent between
the projects in Sj given the costs cij . What is demonstrated above is that
the second component of the cost compensates for the di¤erentials across
the cij .
 The solutions of the primal linear program (L) represent the set of
Pareto optimal physical allocations. The vector y describes not only the
list of selected projects (the public project j is selected if yj > 0), but
also the scale of each of them. In contrast to the traditional framework,
a community is described by its (horizontal) type j 2 M and size yj . As
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already explained, the matrix describes the structure of membership across
individuals and communities together with their membership shares.
3 The Model with Indivisible Public Projects
While the divisible setting of the previous section yields a general existence
result on the set of secession-proof allocations, in this section we explore the
di¢ culties imposed by integer constraints associated with the traditional
framework. More precisely, assume now that all the physical variables are
binary: the project is either selected or not, and each individual is mem-
ber of a single community. A physical outcome consists of a partition of
the population N into k communities (with k  m) with a distinct public
project adopted by each community. The introduction of these constraints
transforms the original linear program (L) into the following integer linear
program4 (bL):
Min
(X;y)
nX
i=1
mX
j=1
cijxij +
mX
j=1
fjyj
such that
mX
j=1
xij  1 for all i = 1; : : : ; n
xij  yj for all i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ;m
xij 2 f0; 1g for all i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ;m (13)
yj 2 f0; 1g for all j = 1; : : : ;m: (14)
This type of integer linear programs is notoriously di¢ cult to solve and
known to be computationally hard. Algorithms with a guaranteed perfor-
mance level, satisfying some computational constraints, have been developed
in the eld of operations research, where the above problem has been studied
very extensively.5 It has been called Uncapacited Facility Location Problem
(UFLP) (Cornuéjols, Nemhauser and Wolsey (1990)) due to the most cel-
ebrated application of this setting of optimal location of facilities and the
assignment of customers to formed facilities. The set M corresponds to the
potential facilities sites (in the geographical space) and the set N corre-
sponds to the actual locations of customers. If the geographical space is R2,
4Balinski (1965) rst introduced this integer linear programming formulation of the
uncapacited facility location problem.
5See Mirchandani and Francis (1990) for an overview of the state of the arts and
ReVelle, Eiselt and Daskin (2008) for a recent selective bibliography.
13
M is a m tuple fqjg1jm of vectors in R2 and N is a n tuple fpig1in
of vectors in R2. Further, it is assumed that there exists a non-decreasing
function h such that the costs cij are equal to h(d (pi; qj)), where d is a dis-
tance on R2 (e.g., Euclidean, rectilinear, Manhattan) for all i = 1; : : : ; n and
j = 1; : : : ;m. The cost cij describes the transportation cost that would be
incurred by a customer located in pi to consume a service located in qj . It is
natural to assume that such costs are non-decreasing with respect to some
appropriate distance. The term uncapacited refers to the public aspect of
the good - there is no limit on the number of customers assigned to a given
facility.
We will denote by bC(N; E) the value of the integer linear program (bL).
As the linear program (L) arises through a linear relaxation of the integer
constraints (13) and (14) in the program (bL), we have
c(N; E)  C(N; E)bC(N; E)  1
A careful examination of the argument presented in Section 2 shows that
C(N; E) is the value of the following linear program
Max
T
nX
i=1
Ti
such that
X
i2S
Ti  bC(S; E) for all S  N;
where bC(S; E) has been dened similarly to C(S; E), except that the linear
constraints xij  0 for all i 2 S and j = 1; : : : ;m have been replaced by the
integer constraints xij 2 f0; 1g for all i 2 S and j = 1; : : : ;m. We deduce
from this simple but important fact that the maximal amount of money
that can be collected without violating the secession-proofness constraints
is equal to C(N; E). Two cases may arise:
C(N; E) = bC(N; E) or c(N; E) = 1. In such case, the total aggregate cost
has been collected without violation of secession-proofness and the core is
nonempty.
C(N; E) < bC(N; E) or c(N; E) < 1. In such case, it is impossible to
recover the total aggregate cost under the secession-proofness requirement.
Only the ratio c(N; E) can be recovered. If this number is su¢ ciently large,
the problem of budget decit can, in some cases, be solved by an external
source. From this perspective, the closer to 1 this ratio is, the more stable"
the environment is.
14
The second case corresponds to what is called an integrality gap" in
integer linear programming. In the case where multiple memberships are
prohibited, the above argument shows that the set of secession-proof alloca-
tions is nonempty only in the absence of the integrality gap.
Goemans ans Skutella (2004) have considered a broader family of facility
location problems: it contains the UFLP as a special case and proved that
for any member of this family the cost allocation problem is equivalent to
the dual of the LP relaxation of the facility location problem. This implies
that the core is non-empty if and only if there is no integrality gap for the
LP relaxation of the cost allocation problem. The family of problems that
they consider is broad enough to accomodate many additional constraints
on facility like, for instance, capacity, quota or incompatibility constraints.
3.1 Metric Environments: The Least Core
We will now examine a subclass of environments called metric environments,
that covers many important applications. We wish to point out that for any
such environment E , the integrality gap is universally" bounded away from
0, i.e., the ratio c(N; E) exceeds some given value  irrespective of the specic
identication of E .
Before providing a formal statement of the result, it is useful to o¤er
an example illustrating basic di¤erences between the continuous and integer
settings. Consider the location environment E in R2 with with four indi-
viduals and four projects, where each individual shares the location with
one project. Let p1 = q1 = (0; 0), p2 = q2 = (1; 0), p3 = q3 = (1; 1) and
p4 = q4 = (0; 1) and the distances are given by:
dij  d(pi; qj) =
8<:
0 if j = i
1 if j = i+ 1 or j = i+ 3 (mod 4)
2 if j = i+ 2 (mod 4)
Also, the costs cij are equal to the distances dij and fj = f > 0 for all
j = 1; 2; 3; 4: Let us calculate the values C(N; E) and bC(N; E). The simple
algebra shows that
bC(N; E) =
8<:
4f if f 2 [0; 1]
2f + 2 if f 2 [1; 2]
f + 4 if f 2 [2;+1[
Depending upon the value of the parameter f , it is optimal to openeither
1, 2 or 4 facilities.6 For the sake of numerical illustration, let us assume that
6The case of 3 facilities occurs also when f = 1.
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f = 2. Then bC(N; E) = 6.
To derive the value of C(N; E), let us dene the set-function D on the
set of nonempty proper subsets of N . Namely, let
D(S) =
8>><>>:
4 if s = 3
4 if S = f1; 3g; or f2; 4g;
3 if S = f1; 2g; f2; 3g; f3; 4g; or f4; 1g;
2 if s = 1;
where s is the cardinality of the set S.
It is easy to see that C(N; E) is the value of the following program (V):
Max
T
X
i2N
Ti such that
X
i2S
Ti  D(S) for all S  N:
The program (V) can be rewritten as7
Max
T
X
i2N
Ti
such that
X
i2S
Ti  4 for all S  N with s = 3
maxfT1 + T2; T2 + T3; T3 + T4; T4 + T1g  3
maxfT1; T2; T3; T4g  2:
It is straightforward to show that the vector
 
4
3 ;
4
3 ;
4
3 ;
4
3

is the unique optimal
solution of this linear program. Therefore, C(N; E) = 163 . In this example,
the ratio C(N;E)bC(N;E) is equal to 89 ' 89%, a value which is quite close to 1! Note
that the primal linear program (L) also has a unique solution
y =

1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3

and
X =
0BB@
1
3
1
3 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 0
0 13
1
3
1
3
1
3 0
1
3
1
3
1CCA
Here, the optimal scale of each facility is 13 and the structure of multiple
memberships presented by the matrix shows that each individual gets her top
7Some non-binding constraints are not presented here.
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choice for one third of the demand and her second best for the remaining two
thirds; she is never assigned to her least preferable facility. The personalized
Lindahl prices of individual 1 are p11 = 43 ; p12 = p14 =
1
3 .
Note that the program (V) can be restated in terms of balanced sets
(Bondareva (1962) and Shapley (1967)) used in the cooperative game theory,
A game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair (N;V ), where N = f1; : : : ; ng
with n  2 is a nite set of players and V is a function that associates a
real number V (S) to each subset S of N . A collection of subsets of N ,
 = fS1; S2; : : : ; SKg is called balanced if for every S 2  there exists a
non-negative number S , called balancing weight, such that
X
S2:i2S
S = 1:
for every player i 2 N . Denote the set of all balanced collections by B. Then
the problem (V) amounts to nding Max
2B
X
S2
SV (S):
The examination of the optimal solution of (L) shows that the bind-
ing constraints are associated with three-person coalitions and the relevant
balanced family of coalitions in (V) is:
ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 3; 4g ; f2; 3; 4gg
with the vector    13 ; 13 ; 13 ; 13 of corresponding balancing weights.
The example yields quite a high value of c(N; E). Is it a pure coincidence?
When we let the parameter f vary, we nd that
C(N; E) =
8<:
4f if f 2 [0; 1]
4f+8
3 if f 2 [1; 4]
f + 4 if f 2 [4;+1[
Thus, the minimal value of c(N; E) with respect to f is attained for f = 2
and is equal to 89%. Quite surprisingly, this ratio is bounded from below
whenever the environment E belongs to the domain of metric environments
described below.
Formally, an environment E = fN;M;D;C; Fg is called metric if
cik  cij + cjl + clk for all i; l 2 N and j; k 2M
This property holds when the sets N andM are points in a metric space and
the cij are dened as the pairwise distances between these points.8 Let M
denote the set of metric environments. Shmoys, Tardos and Aardal (1997)
8As already pointed out, the uncapacited facility location problem has been exten-
sively studied in operations research, especially, in the eld of approximation algorithms.
A number of di¤erent approximation algorithms have been proposed but we are only in-
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were the rst to found that if E 2 M, then c(N; E)  :316: This universal
bound was later rened by Chudak (1998) and Chudak and Shmoys (1999)
to 1=(1 + 2e ) ' 0:576, and, more recently, to 0:632 by Sviridenko (2002).
The mere existence of this absolute constant in the context of a metric
environment, is surprising in itself. On the other hand, Guha and Khuller
(1999) have shown that this problem is hard to approximate within a factor
better than 0:684 implying that there exist metric environments E such that
c(N; E)  0:684.
We deduce from the above results that if E 2 M, then we can always
recover at least 63:2% of the total cost and at most 68:4% in some spe-
cic metric environments. Let us call a feasible allocation (X; y; t) =
xij

1in;1jm
;

yj

1jm
; (ti )1in

-secession proof, if
xij 2 f0; 1g for all i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ;m
yj 2 f0; 1g for all j = 1; : : : ;mX
i2S
mX
j=1
cijx

ij +
X
i2S
ti  bC(S; E) for all S  N
X
i2N
mX
j=1
cijx

ij +
X
i2N
ti   bC(N; E):
Of course, if there exist -secession proof allocations, there are a-secession-
proof allocations for all a  . Let (E) be the largest value of  such
that the environment E admits -secession proof allocations and let T 
(Ti)1in be the n dimensional vector induced by any such (E)-secession
proof allocation. It satises the following list of inequalities:X
i2S
Ti  bC(S; E) for all S  N and X
i2N
Ti = (E) bC(N; E):
terested in those based on the above linear programming relaxation. The motivations are
quite di¤erent from ours. Solving a linear program is easy" according to the theory of
computational complexity. Therefore, if the relaxation leads to a solution which is not too
distant from the solution of the integer linear program, we can use this scheme as an ap-
proximation algorithm with the performance guarantee of c(N; E). In fact, this literature
usually utilizes the reverse ratio 1=c(N; E). For the sake of consistency, we proceed with
our specication. Of course, many other approximation algorithms are not based on LP
rounding (Jain et al. (2003), Jain and Vazirani (2001), Madhian, Ye and Zhang (2002)).
The current best constant factor is 0:66.
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Let eT be the vector where eTi = T i(E) for all i = 1; : : : ; n. The above inequal-
ities translate intoX
i2S
eTi  1
(E)
bC(S; E) for all S  N and X
i2N
eTi = bC(N; E):
This shows that eT belongs to LCm (E), the multiplicative least core of the
environment E , and that

1
(E)   1

is the multiplicative least core value.
The following result summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 2: For any environment E 2 D, the multiplicative least core
value is at most equal to 0:5822
3.2 The One-dimensional Metric Environment: the Core,
the Nucleolus and Other Solutions
In this subsection, we will focus our attention on a one-dimensional spe-
cial case of the metric model discussed in the preceding section. More
precisely, we will consider the environment E = fN;M;D;C; Fg, where
N = f1; : : : ; ng is a nite set of individuals that coincides with the set of
project locationsM . We assume that the costs are cij = d ji  jj and fj = f
for all individuals i and projects j where d and f are positive parameters.
This particular one-dimensional version of the problem describes the situ-
ation where there are n equally populated demand sites located along the
line (main street). The distance between two demand sites is constant (d)
and the cost of transportation is linear with respect to distance. A public
facility can be constructed in any of the demand sites and the set up cost
is independent of the location. The environment E is now described by the
triple fN; d; fg.
Any such environment satises the single peakedness condition.9 To
recall, a domain of environments is single-peaked if there exists an order-
ing  of the projects such that for each i 2 N , there exists a project j(i)
such that cij decreases when j varies from (1) to (j(i)) and increases
when j varies from (j(i)) to (m). For any single-peaked environment, the
results by Goemans and Skutella (2004), Kolen (1983), Tamir (1992) and
Trubin (1976) guarantee the absence of the integrality gap and, hence, the
non-emptiness of the set of secession-proof allocations. Given that the exis-
tence of secession-proof allocations is guaranteed, we will examine whether
9Another domain with this property is the case where the customers and facilities are
located on a tree and the distances are calculated along the paths allowed by the tree.
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it is possible to combine secession-proofness and some fairness requirements
through the selection of an appropriate allocation. As there are many al-
ternative denitions of fairness, we will explore the implications of di¤erent
popular solutions serving as natural candidates to meet these two objectives.
In this setting, the disutility or transportation cost incurred by an in-
dividual located in t and consuming the services of a facility located in
p, is determined by the distance between t and p, i.e., djt   pj: For each
S  N , the minimal transportation cost of the citizens of S is given by
minp2N
P
t2S djt pj. Note that, as S is nite, there always exists an optimal
location of the facility and, therefore, the previous amount is well dened.
It is useful to note that for every set S the total transportation cost is min-
imized when the project is chosen at the median userlocation m(S), that
is determined by the equality jft 2 S : t  m(S)gj = jft 2 S : t  m(S)j:
If S has an odd number of users then its median user is uniquely dened.
However, if S consists of an even number of users, the median user is not
unique. To avoid ambiguity, we denote by m(S) the left-most median of S.
The overall cost of a region S  N will therefore be the sum of its facility
and transportation costs. Formally,
c(S) = f + d min
p2N
X
t2S
jt  pj:
Under our assumptions, c(S) can be reformulated as follows. Let S  N
be a given region and  a bijection between S and f1; 2; : : : ; sg, such that
(k)  (k + 1) for all k. Then,
c(S) = f +
0@[ s2 ] 1X
k=0
((s  k)  (k + 1))
1A  d,
where [x] denotes the integer part of x. In particular, if s = 1, then c(S) = f .
If s = 2; 3 then c(S) = f +maxfji  jj : i; j 2 Sg  d. If s = n, then
c(S) = f +
0@ [n2 ]X
k=1
n  (2k   1)
1A  d = ( f + n24  d if n even
f + n
2 1
4  d if n odd
.
In this environment, an allocation rule is a mapping that associates with
each facility cost f and distance parameter d a cost allocation (f; d) =
(1(f; d); : : : ; n(f; d)) 2 Rn+. In what follows, we omit (f; d) in description
of allocation rules.
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In contrast to the previous part of the paper, we will now focus on
environments where the optimal coalition structure is the grand coalition.
We refer to this situation as N -E¢ ciency.10 Formally,
N-E¢ ciency. An environment E = fN; d; fg is N -e¢ cient if
c(N) 
X
S2
c(S) for all partitions  of N
The proposition below identies necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
N -E¢ ciency:
Proposition 3: The following statements hold:
(i) If n = 4k then E is N -e¢ cient if and only if f  2k2d.
(ii) If n = 4k + 2 then E is N -e¢ cient if and only if f  (2k+1)2+12 d.
(iii) If n = 4k + 1 then E is N -e¢ cient if and only if f  k(2k + 1)d.
(iv) If n = 4k+3 then E is N -e¢ cient if and only if f  (2k2+3k+1)d.
Assume, for instance, that n = 4k. If E is N e¢ cient then
c(N) = f + 4k2d  c(f1; :::; 2kg+ c(f2k + 1; :::; ng) = 2f + 2k2d
or, equivalently, f  2k2d, which proves one implication of (i). As for the
converse implication, it su¢ ces to note that ff1; :::; 2kg; f2k + 1; :::; ngg is
the most expensivepartition of N . The remaining proofs proceed along
the same lines.
N e¢ ciency is a property of cooperative environments where the gains
from cooperation are large, as characterized by Proposition 3. An extremely
relevant selection of the core is the nucleolus. Thus, the next proposition
provides an important instance of secession-proof allocation in this setting.11
10 It is not di¢ cult to show that, for su¢ ciently small values of f , it could be optimal to
avoid transportation costs upon locating a facility at each node. We, nevertheless, prefer
to focus on the case in which the optimal coalition is the grand coalition and hence the
notion of N-e¢ ciency, which, de facto, is excluding low values of f , as we see in Proposition
3.
11As shown in Appendix A3, we prove the statement of Proposition 2 for n  6. We
conjecture that the statement is also true for all n  7.
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Proposition 4: If the environment E is N -e¢ cient and if n  612, there
exists a threshold f0 such that the nucleolus of the cost-sharing game
described above is given by the allocation rule , where:
 If n is even,
 =
f
n
(1; : : : ; 1) + d

n  1
2
;
n  3
2
; : : : ;
3
2
;
1
2
;
1
2
;
3
2
; : : : ;
n  3
2
;
n  1
2

.
 If n is odd and f  f0
 =
f
n  1 (1; : : : ; 1; 0; 1; : : : ; 1)+d ((n); ((n)  1) ; : : : ; 1; : : : ; ((n)  1) ; (n)) ,
where
(n) =

n  1
2
  1
n  1

,
 If n is odd and f  f0
 =
f
n
(1; : : : ; 1) + d

n  1
2
;
n  3
2
; : : : ; 1; 0; 1; : : : ;
n  3
2
;
n  1
2

.
Note that when n is even, the allocation consists in dividing equally the
facility cost and letting every user to pay for its transportation cost. The
case where n is odd is more interesting. If the economies of scale are large
enough, then the solution is the same as in the case where n is even. But if
the economies of scale are large enough to justify the formation of the grand
coalition but still below some critical threshold, then the nucleolus is a more
intricate solution.
It is well known that the Shapley value, the best-known solution for
cost-sharing games, is only a selection of the core for certain domains. This
is not one of them. In order to show this, it su¢ ces to consider the case in
which n = 3. It is not di¢ cult to see that the Shapley value in that case
would be given by: 
2f + 5d
6
;
f + d
3
;
2f + 5d
6

:
Thus, if d  f  54d, the environment would beN -e¢ cient and the allocation
prone to secession. Therefore, there exist N -e¢ cient environments for which
the Shapley value is not a secession-proof allocation.
12This is shown in Appendix A3. We conjecture that the statement is also true for all
n  7.
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Within the set of secession-proof allocations for such environments, we
would like to identify the other allocations which can be considered to be
fair. The task is delicate as there is not a single uncontroversial denition of
fairness. Some of these notions take into account the stand alone cost c(S)
of every coalition S of users so that the strength or legitimate aspirations of
members of coalition S, given by c(S), have to be taken into account. In co-
operative game theory, many popular solutions, including the nucleolus, the
Shapley value and the Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution belong to this family.
Some other notions ignore this "reservation value" and aim to equalize as
much as possible the utilities of the users irrespective of their positions in
the game. In what follows we discuss the properties of solutions based on
these two approaches.
The most popular (partial) ordering of allocations according to fairness is
the so-called Lorenz ordering %L. Given x; y 2 Rn satisfying x1  : : :  xn,
y1  : : :  yn, and
Pn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 yi, we say that x is greater than y in the
Lorenz ordering (x %L y) if
Pk
i=1 xi 
Pk
i=1 yi, for all k = 1; : : : ; n 1, with
at least one strict inequality. This criterion induces a partial ordering on
allocations which reects their relative spread. When x is greater than y in
the Lorenz ordering, the distribution x is unambiguously more egalitarian
than the distribution y. It is well known that this property is equivalent to
saying that y can be obtained from x by means of a nite sequence of trans-
fers from the richer to the poorer. Moreover, the value of any symmetric
relative index satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and the Dalton
population principle is higher at y than at x (see e.g., Atkinson (1970), Das-
gupta, Sen and Starret (1973), Rostchild and Stiglitz (1973), Chakravarty
(1999)). Before appealing to the Lorenz ordering, we present two minimal
(and natural) requirements that are expected from a fair allocation.
First, a requirement of impartiality that says that symmetric agents
should be treated alike.
Symmetry. i = n i+1 for all i = 1; : : : ; [n2 ].
Then, a principle that advocates a positive but limited discrimination
towards users with less extreme locations in the model.
Partial Equalization. For all i; j adjacent agents in N , let ij =
i j . Then, if j is closer than i to the median agent of N , then 0  ij  d.
The concept of partial equalization, introduced by Le Breton and Weber
(2003), says that, even though agents closer to the location of the facility
might contribute less (given that the transportation cost they incur is lower),
they cannot enjoy a reduction in their contribution higher than the distance
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with respect to agents farther away from the location of the facility.13
Let us now investigate the rst approach to provide egalitarian allo-
cations. We focus here on the nucleolus and the Shapley value for this
context.14 It follows from Proposition 2 that the nucleolus is symmetric
and satises the principle of partial equalization in our setting. As for
the Shapley value, it turns out that, although it does not always provide
secession-proof allocations, it can also be defended on the grounds of partial
equalization. For instance, in the three-agent case, it is not di¢ cult to see
that the di¤erence between the cost of the median agent and the corner
agents is d2 for the Shapley value and minff d2 ; dg for the nucleolus. Thus,
ij(N)  ij(Sh) if and only if d  f  2d
ij(N)  ij(Sh) if and only if f > 2d
Then we have
N %L Sh if and only if d  f  2d
Sh %L N if and only if f  2d
Something similar happens for the case in which n = 4. The Shapley value
is then given by 
f + 5d
4
;
3f + 7d
12
;
3f + 7d
12
;
f + 5d
4

From here, it follows that if 2d  f  3d, the environment would be N -
e¢ cient and the Shapley value for that environment prone to secession. It
is also straightforward to see that ij(Sh) = 2d3 and ij(N) = minff d2 ; dg.
Thus, ij(N)  ij(Sh) in all cases. However, we have that
N %L Sh if d  f  73d
Sh %L N if f  73d
Finally, we now consider the second route to provide egalitarian allo-
cations. Rather than focusing on equalizing the surplus of the coalitions,
as the nucleolus does, we focus on equalizing the payments. To do that, a
natural candidate is the allocation E:
Equal-cost rule (E). For all i 2 N , Ei = c(N)n .
In general, E is not a secession-proof rule, unless f is su¢ ciently large.
More precisely,
13The part of the requirement that says that an agent cannot contribute less than
another agent closer to the median agent is usually referred to as monotonicity.
14Some insights on the Dutta-Ray solution and related solutions are also presented in
Appendix A2.
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Proposition 5: The following statements hold:
(i) If n is even then E is a secession-proof rule if and only if f  n24 d
(ii) If n is odd then E is a secession-proof rule if and only if f  (n 1)24 d
In order to prove statement (i), we have to verify the following inequal-
ities:
k
c(N)
n
 c(f1; : : : ; kg), for all k = 1; : : : ; n,
i.e.,
k

f + n
2
4 d

 n

f + k
2
4 d

for all k even between 1 and n
k

f + n
2
4 d

 n

f + k
2 1
4 d

for all k odd between 1 and n
Note that any other coalition of k agents would keep the left hand side
of the inequality equal, but would increase the right hand side, making
the resulting inequality less informative. Now, the above inequalities are
equivalent to
f  kn4 d for all k even between 1 and n
f  n(k(n k)+1)4(n k) d for all k odd between 1 and n
:
Thus, the maxima thresholds are for k = n  2 and k = n  1 respectively,
i.e.,
f
d
 max

n(n  2)
4
;
n2
4

.
Therefore, f  n24 d, as desired.
Assume now that n is odd. Then, the inequalities we have to verify
become
k

f + n
2 1
4 d

 n

f + k
2
4 d

for all k even between 1 and n
k

f + n
2 1
4 d

 n

f + k
2 1
4 d

for all k odd between 1 and n
.
Equivalently,
f  k4

n  1n k

d for all k even between 1 and n
f  kn+14 d for all k odd between 1 and n
:
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Thus, the maxima thresholds are for k = n  1 and k = n  2 respectively,
i.e.,
f
d
 max

(n  1)2
4
;
(n  1)2
4

.
Therefore, f  (n 1)24 d, as desired.
The nal proposition of this section asserts that partial equalization is a
necessary requirement for secession-proofness. More precisely, we show that
if there exists a secession-proof allocation rule that violates partial equal-
ization, then we can always obtain another secession-proof allocation that
dominates the former one in the sense of Lorenz. Such fairness implication of
secession-proofness was already pointed out by Le Breton and Weber (2003)
in a continuous version of this one-dimensional model.
Proposition 6: If a secession-proof allocation violates partial equalization,
then there exists a positive transfer of costs between two immediate
neighbors such that the resulting allocation is also secession-proof.
Proof: Let  be a secession-proof allocation that violates partial equal-
ization. Then, there exist two adjacent agents i; j, with j is closer to the
median agent than i, such that i   j > d. Let " be an arbitrarily small
(positive) number and let " denote the resulting allocation from  after
transferring " from the cost of i to the cost of j. Formally, "i = i   ",
"j = j + " and 
"
k = k, for all k 6= i; j. We show next that " is secession-
proof.
If, on the contrary, " is prone to secession, then there exists a coalition
S  N for which "(S) > c(S)  (S). If so, S must include agent j and
cannot include agent i. Thus, "(S)   (S) = ". As " is arbitrarily small,
this imposes that c(S) = (S).
Let S^ be the resulting coalition from S after replacing j by i, i,e., S^ =
(S n fjg) [ fig. Then,
(S^) = (S)  j + i > (S) + d = c(S) + d. (15)
On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that c(S^)  c(S)+d. Thus,
it follows from (15) that (S^) > c(S^), which contradicts the fact that  is a
secession-proof allocation. 
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4 Conclusions
There are several natural questions that remain open in this line of research.
With respect to public good projects, we could consider settings where public
projects di¤er according to the needs that they are supposed to fulll.15 An
individual could be a member of several communities simply because these
communities provide di¤erent services. In such a setting, we could consider
a set of public projects dened by two components: one that relates to the
physicalnature of the project (hospital, library, swimming pool) whereas
the second captures characteristics of the project, such as its size or location.
In such setting, it seems reasonable to assume that each player may consume
each of the di¤erent physical public goods but may partner with other
individuals who may exhibit di¤erent preferences over specic characteristics
of the project. Under separability, it could be the case that even if each of
the physical public goods is indivisible, a stable partition exists for each of
them separately under full transferability (e.g., if the preferences are single
peaked). We could consider public projects that are subject to congestion
and capacity constraints, the topic that has been analyzed in operations
research as the Capacited Facility Location Problem (CFLP), or to introduce
a more general form of cost functions (Hajiaghayi, Madhian and Mirrokni
(2003)). Finally, we could also examine the cases where individual demands
for public projects are responsive to prices.
Many of the questions examined in this paper are intimately related to
the growing literature on algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
for combinatorial problems. This research conducted mostly by computer
scientists and scholars in operations research focuses on approximation and
algorithms as well as design of mechanisms for sharing the aggregate cost
associated with the specic problem at hand. Most of the combinatorial opti-
mization problems dealing with the computation of C(S) are NP-hard. This
implies that if algorithmic constraints are imposed on any coalition (includ-
ing the grand coalition), C(S) should be replaced by bC(S) > C(S). There
do not exist cost sharing mechanisms which are simultaneously e¢ cient,
group-strategy proof and budget-balanced (e.g., Green et al, 1976). Moulin
(1999) characterizes a whole class of budget-balanced and group-strategy
proof mechanisms and, based on this result, Moulin and Shenker (2001) sin-
gle out the mechanism associated with the Shapley value formula because it
generates the smallest potential deviation from e¢ ciency. Several authors
have taken the alternative (more usual) route and have investigated the class
15On this issue see Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005).
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of group-strategy-proof mechanisms that are almost budget-balanced (e.g.,
Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; and, more recently, Moulin, 2009). To recall,
a cost sharing mechanism is a collection of cost sharing allocations S for
a coalition S that assigns no cost to those outside of S. Given   1, the
mechanism is  budget balanced if:
C(S) 
X
i2S
Si  C(S) for all S  N
It is cross-monotone if S  T implies Si  Ti for all i 2 S. Moulin (1999)
has shown that if a cost sharing mechanism is cross-monotone then one can
construct a group strategy-proof mechanism to elicit the information on the
willingness to pay for the service of the individual. The logical relationship
with the question considered in our paper rests on the fact that for every
 budget balanced cross-monotone cost-sharing mechanism the inequality
1 + "m  1 holds. Any information on values of  (called in this literature,
the budget balance factor) for which there exists a  budget balanced cross
monotonic cost sharing mechanism yields an upper bound on 1 + "m. For
the metric facility location problem considered in this paper, Pal and Tardos
(2003) exhibited a 13 budget balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing mecha-
nism. Immorlica, Mahdian and Mirrokni (2008) determine upper bounds on
 for several cost sharing problems. Devanur, Mihail and Vazirani (2005)
demonstrate the existence of a 0:537-budget balanced, strategy-proof (which
is weaker that cross-monotonicity) and belong to the modied version of the
core. Many of combinatorial games can be expressed as linear programs with
integer constraints. As emphasized by Jain and Varizani (2001), up to some
qualications, the best budget-balance factor is bounded by the integrality
gap of the natural LP-relaxation of the problem.
Appendix
Some of the notions used in the paper as well as the statement and (or) the
proofs of some of the results are stated in the following three appendices.
Appendix A1. Least Core(s) and Nucleolus
Consider a cooperative game with transferable utility as the one intro-
duced in subsection 3.1. It is called super-additive if V (S [ T )  V (S) +
V (T ) for all S; T  N such that S \ T = ?. A player i 2 N is a null-
player (dummy) of (N;V ) if V (S [ fig) = V (S) (V (S [ fig) = V (S) +
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V fig). Hereafter, we denote by XPO 

y 2 Rn jPni=1 yi = V (N)	 the
set of (pre)imputations (or Pareto optimal imputations) and by XIR 
y 2 Rn jPni=1 yi = V (N); yj  V (fjg)8j 2 N	 the set of imputations i.e.,
the set of individually rational preimputations.
Let X be a compact and convex subset of Rn and let x 2 X. We denote
by (x) the 2n-dimensional vector16 whose components are the numbers
e(S; x)  V (S)   Pi2S xi for ;  S  N arranged according to their
magnitude, i.e., i(x)  j(x) for 1  i  j  2n. The nucleolus of (N;V )
with respect to X is the unique17 vector x = Nu(N;V ) 2 X such that (x)
is minimal, in the sense of the lexicographic order, of the sets f(y) j y 2 Xg.
The nucleolus of (N;V ) with respect to XIR will be called hereafter the
nucleolus as originally dened by Schmeidler (1969).18 We denote by  (x)
the 22n-dimensional vector whose components are the numbers e(S; x)  
e(T; x) for ;  S; T  N arranged in the descending order, i.e.,  i(x) 
 j(x) for 1  i  j  22n.
Given a real number , the   core of (N;V ) is the set
C  fx 2 XPO : e(S; x)   for all ? " S & Ng. The least core19 of (N;V ),
denoted LC(V;N) is the intersection of all nonempty   core of (N;V ).20
If (N;V ) is super-additive, then LC(V;N)  XIR. In such case, LC(V;N)
consists of the vectors x such that 1(x) = 1(x). Note that then, x 2
LC(V;N).
Given a TU cooperative game V over the set of players N , the least
core21 of V is, by denition, the set LC(V ) of allocations x that are optimal
16This vector is called the vector of excesses attached to x.
17For a proof of uniqueness, see Peleg and Sudhölter (2003).
18 In contrast, the prenucleolus is the nucleolus with respect to X 
y 2 Rn jPni=1 yi = V (N)	. If the cooperative game is zero-monotonic, i.e., if V (S [
fig)  V (S)  V (fig) for all i 2 N and S  N n fig, the di¤erence between the prenucle-
olus and the nucleolus disappears.
19The notion of least core was rst introduced by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979).
Each payo¤ vector of the least core of a zero-monotonic game is individually rational.
20 In recent years, the least core has received increasing attention from scholars in the
area of combinatorial cooperative games. A combinatorial cooperative game is a cooper-
ative game where the value V (S) or cost C(S) of coalition S arises as the optimal value
of a combinatorial maximization or minimization problem dened by S. Among the most
popular (in addition to the facility location problem), we can cite: network ow games,
minimum-cost spanning tree games (e.g., Granot and Huberman, 1981; 1984), Steiner
tree games, bin packing games, traveling salesman games, scheduling games and, natu-
rally, matching games.
21A very similar concept is considered by Montero (2006) under the name nucleus.
Both concepts coincide if the game is super-additive and the core is empty. If the core is
nonempty, the nucleus coincides with the core.
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solutions to the linear program:
" =Min "
such that x(N) = V (N) and x(S)  V (S)  " for all S  N , S 6= N;?:
The optimal value " is the least core value of the game V :
" = Min
x:x(N)=V (N)
Max
SN;S 6=N;?
e(x; S)
In the case of a TU cost-sharing cooperative game C over the set of players
N , the denition of LC(C) and " is similar:
" =Min " such that x(N) = C(N) and x(S)  C(S)+" for all S  N , S 6= N;?:
Several variants of the least core and the least core value have been discussed
in the literature. We may consider more general valuation of the excesses.
Given an arbitrary penalty function f : 2N ! R, the f Least Core of V ,
LCf (V ) o¤ers a way yo address this issue (e.g., Faigle, Kern and Paulusma,
2000).22 It is the set of allocations that are optimal solutions to the linear
program
"f =Min "
such that x(N) = V (N); and x(S)  V (S) "f(S) for all S  N , S 6= N;?;
and, similarly, in the cost-sharing game.
When f(S) = 1 for all S  N , we obtain the (standard, sometimes called
additive) least core dened before. When f(S) = #S, it is so-called per-
capita least cost (Grotte (1970), Wallmeier (1983)). Finally, when f(S) =
V (S), or f(S) = C(S) in the cost-sharing version of the game, we have the
(multiplicative) least core LCm (V ) (Faigle and Kern (1993)). This is the
version of the least core considered in our paper. The multiplicative version
of the nucleolus has been introduced and analyzed by Faigle et al. (1998),
who called it nucleon.
It is useful for alternative interpretations to consider the multiplicative
least core as describing a model of taxation where coalitions are taxed pro-
portionally to their value.23 Cooperative games with a non-empty core under
taxation at rate " are "-balanced. Note that if we dene the allocation y as
x
1+" in the case of cost-sharing games, we have
y(N) =
C(N)
1 + "
and y(S)  C(S) for all S  N , S 6= N;?:
22See Kern and Paulusma (2009) for an application to ow games.
23This idea has appeared rst in Driessen and Tijs (1986).
30
Of course, if the core of C is empty, "m > 0 and y(N) < C(N). Instead
of the taxation model, we have a subsidy setting: which fraction of the
total cost should be subsidized by an external source to satisfy the stand-
alone constraints of the proper coalitions? The problem of determining the
multiplicative least core LCm (V ) and the multiplicative least core value "m
amounts to solve the linear program:
Max x(N)
such that x(N) = C(N) with x(S)  C(S) for all S  N:
We have:
1 + "m =
C(N)
x(N)
with 1 + "m = Min
x:x(N)=V (N)
Max
SN;S 6=N;?
x(S)
C(S)
:
The formula is the same as in the additive case except that here the excesses
are expressed in a multiplicative form. From a practical perspective, it is
of primary importance to be able to compute the (multiplicative) least cost
value "m. To some extent this value indicates the distance from having
a nonempty core. Faigle and Kern (1993) establish sharp bounds on "m
in matching games on (not necessarily bipartite) graphs. They also derive
upper and lower bounds on "m and show that "m  12 in bin packing games.
They also argue that for Euclidean random traveling salesman games "m '
0:06, with high probability. For a subclass of bin packing games, Kuipers
(1998) has shown that "m =
1
7 . Woeginger (1995) proves that for any bin
packing game "m  13 . Faigle and Kern (1998) improve their earlier results
on "m in bin packing games. Blaser and Shankar Ram (2008) present bounds
on "m for the class of metric salesman games. In a continuous bidimensional
Euclidean version of the facility location problem, Drèze et al. (2008) proved
that "m ' 0:0019!
Appendix A2. Dutta-Ray and other Egalitarian Solutions
Dutta and Ray (1989) (DR - hereafter) dene a solution concept (that they
call the egalitarian solution) for transferable utility cooperative games in
characteristic function form. In that framework individuals believe in equal-
ity as a desirable social goal, although private preferences dictate selsh be-
havior. This latter aspect implies that the solution outcome(s) must satisfy
core-like participation constraints while the concern for equality entails a
choice of Lorenz maximal elements from within the set of payo¤s satisfying
the participation constraints. Despite the Lorenz domination relation being
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a partial ranking, they show that the egalitarian solution is unique whenever
it exists. In order to develop the DR egalitarian allocation we need rst a
piece of notation. The Lorenz map E is dened on the domain of vectors
with the same dimension and mean. For each such set A, E (A) is the set
of all allocations in A that are not Lorenz dominated within A. Formally,
E (A) =
(
x 2 A : @y 2 A such that
kX
i=1
xi 
kX
i=1
yi; for all k = 1; :::; n  1,
)
where x; y 2 Rn are such that x1  x2  :::  xn, y1  y2  :::  yn, andPn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 yi, and one of the above inequalities is strict for some k.
Note, rst, that E (A) may be empty, but that E (A) is nonempty whenever
A is closed. Second, for A  R, E (A) = A: Next, the Lorenz cores of
coalitions are dened recursively.
 The Lorenz core of a singleton coalition is L(fig) = V (fig).
 Now suppose that the Lorenz cores for all coalitions of cardinality k
or less have been dened, where 1 < k < n. The Lorenz core of a
coalition S of size (k + 1) is dened by
L (S) =
(
x 2 Rk+1 :
k+1X
i=1
xi = V (S) and @T  S, y 2 E (L(T )) such that y > x(T ),
)
where x(T ) denotes the projection of x over the coalition T .
If x 2 S, and there is T  S, y 2 E (L(T )) such that y > x(T ), then
we say that y Lorenz-blocks (L-blocks) x. We shall also say in this case that
T L-blocks x. A coalition S will be called viable if EL(S) is nonempty.
An egalitarian allocation exists if the grand coalition is viable. EL(N) will
denote the set of egalitarian allocations, that as DR show will be a singleton
set. It is straightforward to show that C(S)  L(S), where C(S) denotes
the core of coalition S.
DR show that if the game (N,V) is convex the egalitarian solution exists,
belongs to the core and Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the core.
These assertions are not true in general: the core can be nonempty but the
egalitarian allocation may fail to exist; the egalitarian allocation exists but
the core is empty or the core is nonempty and the egalitarian allocation
exists, but the egalitarian allocation does not lie in the core.
Prompted by the conict between the core and DRs egalitarian solution
in general (not necessarily convex) games, Hougaard, Thorlund-Petersen and
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Peleg (2001) propose to focus on the so-called Lorenz maximal imputations,
which is dened as the subset of the core consisting of the allocations that
are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core.24 As they
acknowledge, the problem with this solution concept is that, typically, it is
not single valued. In order to bypass this problem, Arin and Iñarra (2001)
propose, another solution concept, the leximin stable allocation, which is
derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. Hougaard
et al. (2001) dene the Lorenz maximal imputations as the set
LM(N; v) = E(C(N;V )),
where C(N; v) denotes the core of the game (N; v).
Let x; y 2 Rn such that x1  x2  :::  xn, y1  y2  :::  yn. We say
that y leximin dominates x (x l y) if there is some k 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; n  1g
such that xi = yi for i = 1; :::; k and xk+1 > yk+1. Then, the leximin stable
allocation is dened as
LX(N;V ) = x 2 C(N;V ) such that x l y, for all y 2 C(N;V ) n fxg.
We now describe the main features of these egalitarian solutions in the
context of our cost-sharing game (N;C) (normalized to obtain a surplus-
sharing game (N;V )) in the cases where n = 3; 4 and 5.
Example 1: Consider rst the three-agent case. Then, N = f1; 2; 3g,
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(12) = v(23) = f   d; v(13) = f   2d;
v(N) = 2f   2d. Then,
 L(i) = E (L(i)) = 0;
 E (L(23)) = E (L(12)) =
 ; if f < d
(f d2 ;
f d
2 ) if f  d
; E (L(13)) = ; if f < 2d
(f 2d2 ;
f 2d
2 ) if f  2d
.
 L(N) = f(x1; x2; x3) 2 R3+ :
P
xi = 2f 2d;For g  d, (f d2 ; f d2 ) 
(x1; x2); (x2; x3); For f  2d, (f 2d2 ; f 2d2 )  (x1; x3)g;
 E (L(N)) =
 ; if f < d
(23(f   d); 23(f   d); 23(f   d)) if f  d
Thus, the DR egalitarian solution is precisely the equal-split solution,
provided f  d. If we move back from (N,V) to the cost-sharing
24Arin and Iñarra (2001) refer to this solution as the Lorenz stable set.
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game, we would have that the solution is (f+2d3 ;
f+2d
3 ;
f+2d
3 ). It follows
from Proposition 3 that this allocation is secession-proof and hence the
other two solutions proposed above provide here the same solution, as
expected.
Example 2: We now consider the four-agent case. Then, N = f1; 2; 3; 4g,
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = 0, v(12) = v(23) = v(34) = f   d;
v(13) = v(24) = f   2d; v(14) = f   3d; v(123) = v(234) = 2f   2d;
v(134) = v(124) = 2f   3d; v(N) = 3f   4d. Then,
 L(i) = E (L(i)) = 0;
 E (L(34)) = E (L(23)) = E (L(12)) =
 ; if f < d
(f d2 ;
f d
2 ) if f  d
;
E (L(13)) = E (L(24)) =
 ; if f < 2d
(f 2d2 ;
f 2d
2 ) if f  2d
; E (L(14)) = ; if f < 2d
(f 3d2 ;
f 3d
2 ) if f  3d
.
 EL(123) = EL(234) =
 ; if f < d
(23(f   d); 23(f   d); 23(f   d)) if f  d
;
EL(124) = EL(134) =
8<:
; if f < 2d
(f d2 ; f   2d; f d2 ) if 2d  f  3d
(2f 3d3 ;
2f 3d
3 ;
2f 3d
3 ) if f > 3d
 L(N) = f(x1; x2; x3; x4) :
P
xi = 3f 4d; For f  d, (f d2 ; f d2 ) 
(x1; x2); (x2; x3); (x3; x4); For f  2d, (f 2d2 ; f 2d2 )  (x1; x3); (x2; x4);
For f  3d, (f 3d2 ; f 3d2 )  (x1; x4); For f  d, (23(f   d); 23(f  
d); 23(f d))  (x1; x2; x3); (x2; x3; x4); For 2d  f  3d, (f d2 ; f 
2d; f d2 )  (x1; x2; x4); (x1; x3; x4); For f > 3d, (
2f 3d
3 ;
2f 3d
3 ;
2f 3d
3 ) 
(x1; x2; x4); (x1; x3; x4)g
 E(L(N)) =
8><>:
; if f < 2d
f   2d; f2 ; f2 ; f   2d

if 2d  f  4d
(3f 4d4 ;
3f 4d
4 ;
3f 4d
4 ;
3f 4d
4 ) if f > 4d
;
Thus, the DR egalitarian solution is precisely the equal-split solution,
for high values of the facility cost. More precisely, for f  4d. If
we move back from (N,V) to the cost-sharing game, we would have
that the solution is

f+4d
4 ;
f+4d
4 ;
f+4d
4 ;
f+4d
4

. By Proposition 3, this
solution is secession proof. Thus, under the condition, f  4d the
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other two solutions proposed above provide here the same solution, as
expected. If 2d  f  4d, then the Lorenz maximal imputations is
just a singleton set: f

2d; f2 ;
f
2 ; 2d

g and therefore the leximin stable
solution for this case is also

2d; g2 ;
f
2 ; 2d

. The corresponding solution
to the associated TU-fame would be

f   2d; f2 ; f2 ; f   2d

, the DR
egalitarian solution.
Appendix A3. The Nucleolus in the One-dimensional Metric
Environment
In this appendix, we explicitly derive the nucleolus in the one dimensional
equidistant environment with no more than seven players. For the specic
case of three agents, we examine a more general case in which the two
individuals at the extreme are not necessarily equidistant from the median.
The three-agent case
let N = f1; 2; 3g. Let x denote the distance between 1 and 2 and y the
distance between 2 and 3, and assume, without loss of generality, that x  y.
x y
1 2 3
  
- -
The next lemmata conveys our main results for this case.
Lemma 1: N -E¢ ciency holds if and only if f  y.
If N e¢ ciency holds, then
c(N) = f + x+ y  c(f1; 2g+ c(f3g) = 2f + x;
or, equivalently, f  y. As for the converse implication, it su¢ ces to note
that ff1; 2g; f3gg is the most expensivepartition of N . 
Lemma 2: The nucleolus is given by
f + x
2
;
x+ y
2
;
f + y
2

if y  f  2x+ y
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
f + 4x+ y
4
;
f + y
4
;
f + y
2

if 2x+ y  f  3y
f
3
+ x;
f
3
;
f
3
+ y

if f  3y
In order to prove this lemma, assume rst that y  f  2x+ y. Let
 =

f + x
2
;
x+ y
2
;
f + y
2

;
It is straightforward to show that
nX
i=1
i = f + x+ y = c(N). Note that
the distribution of surpluses (cost-savings) associated to  is given by
e(; f1g) = e(; f2; 3g) = f   x
2
;
e(; f3g) = e(; f1; 2g) = f   y
2
;
e(; f2g) = 2f   x  y
2
;
e(; f13g) = x+ y
2
:
It is straightforward to demonstrate that, for the range being considered,
y  f  2x+ y,
min
S
e(; S) = min

f   y
2
;
x+ y
2

 0, (16)
which shows that  is secession-proof for such a range.
Let now  = (1; 2; 3) be the secession-proof allocation that lexico-
graphically maximizes the distribution of cost-savings in this case. Note
that, if y  f  2x+ y, then f y2  f x2  x+y2 and, in particular,
e(; S)  f   y
2
for all S:
Assume, by contradiction, thatminfe(; S)g > f y2 . Then, in particular,
minfe(; f1; 2g); e(; f3g)g > f   y
2
;
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and, therefore,
1 + 2 < c(f1; 2g) 
f   y
2
= f + x  f   y
2
(17)
and
3 < c(f3g) 
f   y
2
= f   f   y
2
(18)
Adding (17) and (18) we have
3X
i=1
i < 2f + x  (f   y) = f + x+ y
However, by secession-proofness,
3X
i=1
i = c(N) = f + x+ y,
which represents a contradiction. Thus,
e(; f1; 2g) = e(; f3g) = f   y
2
;
and, therefore,
3 = f  
f   y
2
=
f + y
2
= 3. (19)
Given the distribution of cost-savings associated to , and the fact that the
domain condition y  f  2x+y for this case guarantees f y2  f x2  x+y2 ,
we know that
minfe(; f1g); e(; f2; 3g)g  f   x
2
:
If, by contradiction, minfe(; f1g); e(; f2; 3g)g > f x2 , then
2 + 3 < c(f2; 3g) 
f   x
2
= f + y   f   x
2
(20)
and
1 < c(f1g) 
f   x
2
= f   f   x
2
: (21)
Adding (20) and (21) we have
3X
i=1
i < 2f + y   (f   x) = f + x+ y;
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which, again, violates secession-proofness. Thus,
e(; f2; 3g) = e(; f1g) = f   x
2
;
and, therefore,
1 = f  
f   x
2
=
f + x
2
= 1.
Finally, by secession-proofness,
2 = c(N)  1   3 =
y + x
2
= 2;
as desired. 
We now move to the case in which 2x+ y  f  3y. Let
 =

f + 4x+ y
4
;
f + y
4
;
f + y
2

;
Then, the distribution of cost-savings associated to  is given by
e(; f1; 3g) = e(; f2; 3g) = f + y
4
;
e(; f3g) = e(; f1; 2g) = f   y
2
;
e(; f1g) = 3f   4x  y
4
; e(; f2g) = 3f   y
4
:
Let  = (1; 2; 3) be the secession-proof allocation that lexicographi-
cally maximizes the distribution of cost-savings in this case. An analogous
argument to the one in the previous case allows us to show here too that
e(; f1; 2g) = e(; f3g) = f   y
2
;
and, therefore,
3 = f  
f   y
2
=
f + y
2
= 3.
Now, given the distribution of cost-savings associated to , and the fact
that the domain condition 2x + y  f  3y for this case guarantees that
f y
2  f+y4  3f 4x y4 , we know that minfe(; f1; 3g); e(; f2; 3g)g  f+y4 .
Assume, by contradiction, that
minfe(; f1; 3g); e(; f2; 3g)g > f + y
4
:
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Then,
2 + 3 < c(f2; 3g) 
f + y
4
=
3
4
(f + y) (22)
and
1 + 3 <
3
4
(f + y) + x (23)
Adding (22) and (23) we have
1 + 2 + 23 <
3
2
(f + y) + x:
Since 3 =
f+y
2 the above translates into
1 + 2 <
f + y
2
+ x:
which, again, represents a contradiction with secession-proofness, as 1 +
2 = f + x+ y   f+y2 = f+y2 + x. Thus,
e(; f2; 3g) = e(; f1; 3g) = f + y
4
;
and, therefore,
1 = c(f1; 3g) 
f + y
4
 3 = f +x+y 
f + y
4
  f + y
2
=
f + 4x+ y
4
= 1,
and
2 = c(f2; 3g) 
f + y
4
  3 = f + y  
f + y
4
  f + y
2
=
f + y
4
= 2;
as desired. 
Finally, we focus on the case in which f  3y. Let
 =

f
3
+ x;
f
3
;
f
3
+ y

;
Then, the distribution of cost-savings associated to  is given by
e(; f1; 3g) = e(; f1; 2g) = e(; f2; 3g) = f
3
;
e(; f1g) = 2f
3
  x; e(; f2g) = 2f
3
; e(; f3g) = 2f
3
  y:
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Let  = (1; 2; 3) be the secession-proof allocation that lexicograph-
ically maximizes the distribution of cost-savings in this case. Given the
distribution of cost-savings associated to , and the fact that the domain
condition f  3y for this case guarantees 2f3   y  f3 , we know that
minfe(; f1; 3g); e(; f1; 2g); e(; f2; 3g)g  f3 .
Assume that minfe(; f1; 3g); e(; f1; 2g); e(; f2; 3g)g > f3 . Then,
f < c(f1; 2g)+c(f1; 3g)+c(f2; 3g) 2c(N) = (f+x)+(f+x+y)+(f+y) 2(f+x+y);
a contradiction. Thus,
e(; f1; 2g) = e(; f2; 3g) = e(; f1; 3g) = f
3
;
and, therefore,
i + j = c(fi; jg) 
f
3
,
for all pair of agents i and j. It is straightforward to conclude from here
that
 =

f
3
+ x;
f
3
;
f
3
+ y

= ;
as desired. 
This lemma shows us that there is a main di¤erence worth remarking
between the equidistant and general three-agent cases. In the general case
we have just described, there is an intermediate case, that was not feasible in
the equidistant case (if x = y, then x+2y = 3y, and therefore only 3y = 3x
would emerge as a threshold separating both cases).
Corollary 1: For the equidistant case (x = y = d), the nucleolus is given
by 
f + d
2
; d;
f + d
2

if d  f  3d
f
3
+ d;
f
3
;
f
3
+ d

if f  3d
The four-agent case
Let now N = f1; 2; 3; 4g. We know from Proposition 3 that N -E¢ ciency
holds in this setting if and only if f  2d. Then, we have the following:
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Lemma 3: The nucleolus is given by
f + 6d
4
;
f + 2d
4
;
f + 2d
4
;
f + 6d
4

For each S 2 2N , let e(; S) be the total amount that the members of
coalition S save as a group relative to their stand-alone cost, when  is
implemented. Formally,
e(; S) = c(S)  (S) = f +
0@[ s2 ] 1X
k=0
((s  k)  (k + 1))
1A  d X
i2S
i
Let  =

f+6d
4 ;
f+2d
4 ;
f+2d
4 ;
f+6d
4

. We show next that  is the secession-
proof allocation that lexicographically maximizes the distribution of cost-
savings. We also have the following:
e(; S) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
f
2 if S 2 ff13g; f24g; f23g; f14gg 2d
4 if S 2 ff123g; f234g; f134g; f124gg
f 2d
2 if S 2 ff12g; f34gg
3f 6d
4 if S 2 ff1g; f4gg
3f 2d
4 if S 2 ff2g; f3gg
It is not di¢ cult to show that
min
SN
fe(; S)g = f   2d
4
: (24)
Thus, note that, because f  2d, e(; S)  0 for all S  N . As
e(; N) = 0, it follows that  is secession-proof. Let  = (1; 2; 3; 4) be
the secession-proof allocation that lexicographically maximizes the distrib-
ution of cost-savings. Then, e(; S)  f 2d4 for all S  N . Assume, by con-
tradiction, that there is a three-agent coalition S0 for which e(; S0) >
f 2d
4 .
Then, we would have the following:
1 + 2 + 3  3f+10d4 = e(; f123g)  f 2d4
2 + 3 + 4  3f+10d4
1 + 3 + 4  3f+14d4
1 + 2 + 4  3f+14d4
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 < f + 4d: which
would contradict secession-proofness. Consequently, e(; S) = f 2d4 for all
three-agent coalition S. By this, it follows that
1 + 22 =
3f + 10d
4
and 21 + 2 =
3f + 14d
4
;
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from where we obtain that 1 =
f+6d
4 , and 2 =
f+2d
4 , which proves that
 = : 
The ve-agent case
Let now N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. We know from Proposition 3 that N -E¢ ciency
holds in this setting if and only if f  3d. Then, we have the following:
Lemma 4: The nucleolus is given by
f + 7d
4
;
f + 3d
4
; d;
f + 3d
4
;
f + 7d
4

if 3d  f  5d
f
5
;
f
5
;
f
5
;
f
5
;
f
5

+ (2d; d; 0; d; 2d) if f > 5d
In order to prove this lemma, assume rst that 3d  f  5d and let
 =

f+7d
4 ;
f+3d
4 ; d;
f+3d
4 ;
f+7d
4

. We have the following:
e(; S) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
3f 7d
4 if S = f1g
3(f d)
4 if S 2 ff2g; f13g; f23gg
f   d if S = f3g
f 3d
2 if S 2 ff12g; f123gg
f d
2 if S 2 ff14g; f134g; f234g; f135gg
f+d
2 if S 2 ff15g; f24gg
f d
4 if S 2 ff125g; f124g; f1234g; f1345gg
d if S = f1245g
By symmetry, we can obtain e(; S) for the remaining coalitions that
do not appear above. Because f  5d, it is straightforward to show that
min
S
fe(; S)g = f   3d
2
Thus, as f  3d, e(; S)  0 for all S  N and e(; N) = 0, which shows
that  is secession-proof. Let  = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5) be the secession-proof
allocation that lexicographically maximizes the distribution of cost-savings.
Then, e(; S)  f 3d2 for all S  N . In particular,
e(; f123g)  f   3d
2
and e(; f45g)  f   3d
2
.
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Assume, by contradiction, that one of the two above inequalities is strict.
Then, we would have the following:
1 + 2 + 3 
f + 7d
2
and 4 + 5 
f + 5d
2
;
with at least one strict inequality. Thus,
X
i2N
i < f+6d; which would contra-
dict secession-proofness. Consequently, e(; f123g) = e(; f45g) = f 3d2 . By
a symmetric argument, we can show that e(; f12g) = e(; f345g) = f 3d2 .
Thus, it follows that
1 + 2 =
f + 5d
2
and 1 + 2 + 3 =
f + 7d
2
;
from where we obtain that
3 = d. (25)
Now, let S be the set of coalitions whose cost-savings is minimal under ,
i.e.,
S =

S : e(; S) =
f   3d
2

= ff123g; f345g; f12g; f45gg.
Then, it is not di¢ cult to show that
min
S=2S
fe(; S)g = f   d
4
(26)
Thus, because  is the cost-allocation that lexicographically maximizes
the distribution of cost-savings, we have that e(; S)  f d4 for all S =2 S.
Let bS = ff1345g; f1234g; f1235g; f2345gg. Assume, by contradiction, that
e(; S) > f d4 for some S 2 bS. Then, we would have the following:
1 + 3 + 4 + 5  3(f+7d)4
1 + 2 + 3 + 4  3f+17d4
1 + 2 + 3 + 5  3(f+7d)4
2 + 3 + 4 + 5  3f+17d4
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, by (25),
3(1 + 2 + 4 + 5) < 3f + 15d,
from where it follows thatX
i2N
i = (1 + 2 + 4 + 5) + d < f + 6d,
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which contradicts secession-proofness. Consequently, e(; S) = f d4 for all
S 2 bS. Then, it follows that
1 + 4 + 5 = 1 + 2 + 5 =
3f+17d
4
1 + 2 + 4 = 2 + 4 + 5 =
3f+13d
4
.
Equivalently,
21 + 2 =
3f + 17d
4
; 1 + 22 =
3f + 13d
4
; 1 = 5; 2 = 4:
Hence, 1 =
f+3d
4 = 5, and 2 =
f+7d
4 = 4, which proves that  = 


Assume now that f > 5d and let  =

f
5 ;
f
5 ;
f
5 ;
f
5 ;
f
5

+ (2d; d; 0; d; 2d).
We have the following:
e(; S) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
4f
5   2d if S = f1g
4f
5   d if S = f2g
4f
5 if S = f3g
3f
5   2d if S = f12g
3f
5 if S 2 ff23g; f13g; f14g; f15g; f24gg
2f
5   d if S 2 ff123g; f124g; f125gg
2f
5 if S 2 ff234g; f134g; f135gg
f
5 if S = N n fkg
Note that, by symmetry, we can obtain e(; S) for the remaining coalitions
that do not appear above. Because f > 5d, it is straightforward to show
that
min
SN
fe(; S)g = f
5
(27)
Let  = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5) be the secession-proof allocation that lexico-
graphically maximizes the distribution of cost-savings. Then, e(; S)  f5
for all S  N . In particular, e(;N n fkg)  f5 for all k. Assume, by con-
tradiction, that e(;N n fkg) > f5 for some k. Then, we would have the
following:
2 + 3 + 4 + 5  f + 4d  f5
1 + 3 + 4 + 5  f + 5d  f5
1 + 2 + 4 + 5  f + 6d  f5
1 + 2 + 3 + 4  f + 5d  f5
1 + 2 + 3 + 4  f + 4d  f5
44
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, 4(1+2+3+4+5) < 4f+24d,
from where it follows that
X
i2N
i < f + 6d, which contradicts secession
proofness. Consequently, e(; S) = f5 for all S 2 bS. Then, it follows that
f + 6d  1 = f + 6d  5 = 4f5 + 4d
f + 6d  2 = f + 6d  4 = 4f5 + 5d
f + 6d  3 = 4f5 + 6d
Hence, 1 =
f+10d
5 = 5, 2 =
f+5d
5 = 4, and 3 =
f
5 , which proves that
 =  
The six-agent case
Let now N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. We know from Proposition 3 that N -E¢ ciency
holds in this setting if and only if f  5d. Then, we have the following:
Lemma 5: The nucleolus is given by
f
6
;
f
6
;
f
6
;
f
6
;
f
6
;
f
6

+

5
2
d;
3
2
d;
1
2
d;
1
2
d;
3
2
d;
5
2
d

We have the following:
e(; S) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
5
6(f   3d) if S 2 ff1g; f6gg
5
6(f   95d) if S 2 ff2g; f5gg
5
6(f   35d) if S 2 ff3g; f4gg
2
3f   3d if S 2 ff12g; f56gg
2
3f   d if S 2 ff13g; f46gg
2
3f if S 2 ff14g; f36g; f15g; f26g; f16g; f23g; f45g; f24g; f35g; f25g; f34gg
1
2(f   5d) if S 2 ff123g; f456gg
1
2(f   3d) if S 2 ff124g; f356g; f125g; f256g; f126g; f156gg
1
2(f   d) if S 2 S1
1
3(f   3d) if S 2 ff1234g; f3456g; f1235g; f2456g; f1236g; f1456gg
f
3 if S 2 S2
1
6(f   3d) if jSj = 5
,
where
S1 = ff134g; f346g; f135g; f246g; f136g; f146g; f145g; f236g; f234g; f345g; f235g; f245gg;
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and
S2 = ff1245g; f2356g; f1246g; f1356g; f1256g; f1345g; f2346g; f1346g; f2345gg:
It is not di¢ cult to show that
min
SN
fe(; S)g =

1
2(f   5d) if 5d  f  6d
1
6(f   3d) if f > 6d
(28)
Thus, we distinguish two cases.
 Case 1: 5d  f  6d
Let  = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) be the secession-proof allocation that lex-
icographically maximizes the distribution of cost-savings. Then, e(; S) 
1
2(f   5d) for all S  N . Assume that either e(; f123g) > 12(f   5d), or
e(; f456g) > 12(f   5d). Then, we would have the following:
1 + 2 + 3 
f + 9d
2
and 6 + 5 + 4 
f + 9d
2
;
with at least one strict inequality. Thus,
X
i2N
i < f + 9d, which contradicts
secession-proofness. Consequently, e(; f123g) = 12(f   5d) = e(; f456g).
Given the distribution of cost-savings associated to  provided above,
we know that e(; S)  16(f   3d) for all S =2 ff123g; f456gg. Assume that
there exists a ve-agent coalition S for which e(; S) > 16(f  3d). Then, we
would have the following:
2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6  5f6 + 13d2
1 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6  5f6 + 15d2
1 + 2 + 4 + 5 + 6  5f6 + 17d2
1 + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6  5f6 + 17d2
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6  5f6 + 15d2
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5  5f6 + 13d2
.
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, 5
X
i2N
i < 5f + 45d, which contra-
dicts secession-proofness. Consequently, e(; S) = 16(f 3d) for all ve-agent
coalition S. Thus,
f + 9d  1 = f + 9d  6 = 5f6 + 13d2
f + 9d  2 = f + 9d  5 = 5f6 + 15d2
f + 9d  3 = f + 9d  4 = 5f6 + 17d2
from where we easily obtain that k = 

k for all k.
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 Case 2: f > 6d
Let  = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) be the secession-proof allocation that lex-
icographically maximizes the distribution of cost-savings. Then, e(; S) 
1
6(f   3d) for all S  N . Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a
ve-agent coalition S such that e(; S) > 16(f   3d). Then, an analogous
argument to the one made in Case 1 concludes. 
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